images will govern the experience, behavior, desire, and perceptions of
individuals and society, which raises the question, what does govern mean
when no decisions need to be made and where administration is
automatic? In a telematic society, does it still make sense to speak of
government, of power and the powerful? If politics is understood to be
the art of informing, then the question becomes how rather than what: in
a telematic society, how does governing, the exercise of power, the
administration of justice occur? To go straight to the obvious answer,
cybernetically. I am defining cybernetic here - without claiming general
applicability - as automatic guidance and control of complex systems to
take advantage of improbable accidents and to generate information.
(Flusser 2011 [1985], pp. 123 and 125)
As this passage indicates, the basic model or structure of governing and
ruling, in Flusser's telematic society, is not that of a central brain that rules,
decides, commands, etc., but rather a model which resembles an ant heap or
formicary consisting of 'networked' individual brains: "According to this model,
the telematic society is a structure in which human brains follow the same
cybernetic methods as ant brains. They function for one another, and function
predominates." (p. 130) However, Flusser adds an important adjustment to his
metaphor of an ant heap or formicary consisting of networked individual brains,
namely that the network structure of telematic society has no 'outside' to relate
to. In this sense, telematic society entails a double reversal of the traditional
archontic model. Firstly, the primary center is distributed across, essentially
equal, nodes or junctions of a network - up to the point that there is no primary
center anymore (topology). Secondly, the clock speed of the linear rhythm of
sending and receiving, from the center and back, is increased by direct, live,
dialogical linkage of the aforementioned nodes and junctions - up to the point
that the linear becomes a point (nomology). And one could wonder whether
the Derridian notion of topo-nomology is still useful, functional or applicable
here, because digital domiciliation would include the whole of telematic society.
The notion of domiciliation tends to become dysfunctional in the sense that it
ceases to deliver concepts and distinctions by means of which we can understand
archives and society.
17. The last element of Derrida's conception of the archive, which we aim to
reinterpret in this section, is the element of consignation. Let's first draw
some conclusions from our analysis so far. The disappearance of the archontic
principle in Flusser's conception of a utopian-telematic society (see #16)
seems to eliminate the very raison d'être of the archive as we know it, namely
the accommodation and safeguarding of governmental accountability and
the subsequent (re-)use for civic, scientific (e.g., historical), or perhaps even
entrepreneurial, purposes. Although a lot of current developments in the
archival field can be interpreted in terms of telematic society announcing and
enforcing itself, it would be premature to conclude that the archive and its
functions are simply and totally becoming obsolete.
As explained above (see #7), Derrida's conception of the function of
consignation must be understood as the executive counterpart of, and within,
any particular topo-nomological setting. Additionally, Derrida stresses
that consignation does not only concern the executive part (including the
results thereof), but also what this part always already presupposes. Given
the current transitional situation of, on the one hand, telematic society and
its intrinsic structure of networked nodes enforcing itself, and, on the other
hand, governments and their intrinsic archontic structure still existing, one
could conclude that there are actually two different areas or settings where
consignation takes place - and that both need to be addressed theoretically
and practically. The first, more traditional, area would be that of, primarily,
accommodation and safeguarding of governmental accountability, in which the
guardianship and control of digital information is the crucial topic. The second,
newer, area would be that of the accommodation and safeguarding transparency
of algorithmic processing and the subsequent (re-)usability for dialogical
purposes.
V. Conclusion
18. Both Derrida and Flusser provide highly valuable insights into the present day
archival transition from analog to digital, or from scriptural and discursive
records to algorithmically processed and dialogical technical images. In our
view, Derrida scrutinises the traditional function and positioning of an archive
as determined by the concept of a record, as well as its specific physical and
institutional context. Although he is very much aware of the possible impact
of technology, including digital technologies, he fails to sufficiently thematise
important content-technical aspects of the present day digital archive. In a way,
Derrida remains captivated by the archival promise of delivering live memory.
Flusser, on the other hand, focuses precisely on the concrete content-technical
nature of the digital. His analysis aims to envision a utopian, 'science-fictional',
cybernetically governed society, in which the historical or commemorative
function of an archive will ultimately become dysfunctional and obsolete.
However, we argue that democratic accountability and control still presupposes a
traditional conception of the archive. Hence, it is imperative that the appropriate
recording functionality should be 'built in' to the digital.
19. To close this article, and in view of further discussion, we formulate five more
or less programmatic questions, or theses, regarding the archival transition to
the digital.
i. As to archival science or theory: Should the record-based approach to the
archive be replaced by the functional approach in terms of algorithmic
processing? Obviously, all digital information, including digital records, is
processed algorithmically. Our thesis is that the impact on the archival
function of the intrinsic, technical, effects of digital mediality (without
analog counterpart), can be better accounted for from the functional
approach.
ii. As to data science: Could existing archival concepts, and the specific
detailed archival knowledge they entail, be (re-)used in the approach of
algorithmic processing, to enhance and enrich the desired functionality in
this particular field? And which particular concepts would be relevant in
this respect? One could think, here, of concepts like authenticity,
provenance, and accessibility.
archives in liquid times
134
arnoud glaudemans and jacco verburgt the archival transition
from analogue to digital: revisiting derrida and flusser
135